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Abstract—Current networks are increasingly growing in size
and complexity and so is the amount of monitoring data that
they produce. As a result, network monitoring systems have to
scale accordingly. As a possible approach, horizontal scalability
can be achieved by large data centralization systems based on
clusters, which are expensive and difficult to deploy in a real
production scenario. In this paper we propose and evaluate a
series of methodologies, deployed in real industrial production
environments, for network monitoring and management, from
the architecture design to the visualization system as well as for
the anomaly detection methodologies, that intend to squeeze the
vertical resources and overcome the difficulties of data collection
and centralization.
Keywords—Network management, anomaly detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The information era has transformed the way societies
communicate in a way not seen since the Gutenberg printer
revolution, enabling the world to transmit information world
wide almost instantaneously through the interconnection of
computers, which today shape the Internet into a set of
heterogeneous networks. Gone are the days in which BBS,
Usenet, and e-mail were the only applications to be found
in the Internet. As the number of users and devices joined
the Internet, the value of the network outweighed the cost of
belonging to it [1], [2] and the Internet became omnipresent.
Today, the ever growing number of users and services
connected to the Internet [3] poses new challenges for
the network management systems, with more complex
and heterogeneous systems interconnected by diverse
protocols, offering services that are becoming more and more
indispensable (e.g. shopping, social networks, etc.). This
growing need for service ubiquity impacts the size of data
centers [4] as well as the volume of data they manage [5],
[6], which in turn affects the monitoring systems.
Monitoring systems are vital for Quality of Service (QoS)
management and troubleshooting of incidences, therefore, a
well suited system helps to prevent and locate the source of
the issues, reducing the operational expenditure (OPEX) of
network infrastructures.
Additionally, QoS of most of these services has an strong
relationship with the Quality of Experience (QoE) [7] which
makes these services more sensible as they require greater
availability. Service outages are one of the main concerns of
any data center and network manager, as the cost per minute
of data center outage can reach 8,000 USD per minute [8],
directly affecting OPEX. To prevent such incidents, traffic
analysis is a crucial task to proactively identify potential
sources of trouble, before they happen.
In this paper we propose a series of Keep It Simple and
Straightforward (KISS) methodologies for anomaly detection
in big data centers with limited resources, or, in other words,
keeping a good balance between the size of the data cen-
ter and the monitoring system, but without disregarding the
effectiveness of the system. In particular, we explore the
different stages involved in the monitoring process (collection,
processing, anomaly detection, etc.) and propose simpler, yet
effective, techniques.
Such techniques must be simple, in order to cope with the
growing volumes of data, but also versatile to deal with the
vagaries of the analysts. Exceptionally, we were privileged to
deploy the researched and developed systems in real environ-
ments, in particular, a Spanish logistics company, in which we
obtained invaluable feedback, that resulted extremely helpful
for the development of the systems described below.
When a disruption arises in a particular QoS metric from
a component of the data center, the impact may extend to
the QoE, affecting the final user, either delaying the service
process, or, in the most severe cases, causing a service outage.
Locating the source of trouble in heterogeneous networks is
not a trivial task, and it is necessary to distinguish between
causes and effects, since a troubled component may be affected
by another malfunctioning component it depends upon.
We will later discuss the system aspects, delving deeper
into the proposed proactive and reactive methodologies for
anomaly detection.
In what follows, we will provide insights into some
alternatives from the literature and the current approaches
used by large corporations. Afterwards, we will depict the
network management architecture currently in production in
the aforementioned infrastructure. Then, we will describe the
different methods used for an effective monitoring which help
to prevent and locate sources of trouble, specifically two pair
of proactive/reactive methodologies for anomalous behaviour
in time series and Web access events. We will also address
the performance issues of these techniques.
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A. State of the art
Monitoring systems present an ETL-like (Extract Transform
and Load) cycle, comprising generation of management infor-
mation, data collection, processing, storage, and the further
analysis of the retrieved information and its visualization.
1) Event and traffic monitoring systems: The first challenge
of an effective monitoring system is the collection of all
relevant data from the network nodes. These nodes produce
data of different nature such as network traffic from the served
applications (e.g. HTTP, Radius, etc.), log messages from the
running services (e.g. Java exceptions), and management data
from the different network nodes (e.g. CPU and memory
usage). This raw information can be stored in high-speed
storage for further processing and analysis.
During the last years, the interest about this type of anomaly
detection systems has increased with the growth of data centers
and the number of hosted services. However, most of these
systems require either complex machine learning techniques,
or deployment of agents in the supervised machines.
For instance, the system proposed by Zhang et al. [9]
seeks to find the root cause of the incidences and anomalies
through the behavioral analysis of the threads and resources
used by executed applications. To obtain this information, the
deployment of Python agents in different machines is a pre-
requisite, with the subsequent difficulties from the constraints
of production systems.
Bahl et al. also propose a solution that uses agents to
monitor network packets sent and received by hosts [10].
Although this solution finds performance problems “without
requiring modifications to existing applications and network
components”, it requires changes in production systems which
often present different operating systems or environments.
As stated above, the proposed system must be as omni-
scient as possible, gathering as much information as possible,
but it is also important to know that monitoring systems cannot
be omnipotent, as some solutions seem to assume. This is a
hurdle to overcome, in which large infrastructures are often
organized in different and outsourced departments, with strong
constraints regarding security, confidentiality and availability,
disallowing any process that may interfere the proper behavior
of their systems. Consequently, a passive, centralization system
should be in order, contrary to the aforementioned systems
approaches. These passive systems also face security obstacles
disseminated across the network such as firewalls or intrusion
detectors that require consent from managers.
2) Data centralization: Many applications already provide
event records about resource and traffic usage with high level
of detail. Generally the challenge is not to create monitoring
information but to collect it for further analysis, that otherwise
would stay in the machine waiting for manual inspection from
the system managers seeking answers for troubleshooting.
Big data solutions employ proportionless systems with
excessive resources (e.g. a cluster of nodes) which feels de trop
in infrastructures where resources are scarce. For example,
Kepner et al. compared different database technologies such
as Cassandra, Oracle and Accumulo, with the latter offering
the best performance. Even though they achieve 115 million
inserts per second in an Accumulo database, they require a
vast amount of resources, specifically, 216 Accumulo nodes
and 1,296 ingest processes, with an average performance of
100,000 entries/second per ingest process [11].
Hence, monitoring systems must be dimensioned and
designed in accordance with the data center size, squeez-
ing vertical resources and taking advantage of its privileged
standpoint in the enterprise network, without disregarding
performance.
3) Information processing: In fact, the third step is to
process all this information by different means, through high-
performance traffic dissectors [12], [13] or log-parsing engines
such as FluentD or Logstash. Afterwards, the processed data
can be stored in non-relational databases like Elasticsearch,
Solr or Splunk. Is not the purpose of this work to review all
these alternatives but the performance must be in accordance
with the rate of collected information. As we process the
raw information to get enriched records we tend to aggregate
the information and reduce its amount, reducing the need of
performance and leaving space for versatility.
4) Anomaly detection: Last but not least, anomaly de-
tection systems must as well fit the above-mentioned needs
of versatility and performance. There are complex solutions
with strong mathematical background [14]–[17] able to detect
subtle deviations in the metric behavior. Notwithstanding, is
essential to dispose of a simpler and faster system able to
detect anomalies among the numerous monitored metrics and
their corresponding time-series in a timely manner.
Furthermore, the human element calls for alarm contain-
ment, since recurrent alerts, whether they are legitimate or
not, produce apathy in the system managers, who will mute
future warnings, loosing confidence in the alarm system. In
other words, it is preferable to generate alarms about severe
incidents with probable impact at the expense of muting minor
deviations, unless the latter happens repeatedly over time,
which requires adjusting the intervals between the first alert
and the successive warnings.
Systems such as the proposed by Calheiros et al. [18]
use Isolation Forest [19], proposed by Liu et al., to detect
anomalies. This method benefits from the fact that anomalies
are scarce and usually isolated from the normal observations.
They randomly choose the characteristics to be considered
and split them recursively creating a series of partitions. The
method isolates the anomalous values near the root of binary
trees, using them to represent the available data.
However, in their own words, “Initial attempts of applying
iForest with such small number of attributes did not lead
to good anomaly detection power on the approach.”. Thus,
the authors obtained a new group of attributes from previous
observations, generating a new set of expected values that
define the usual behaviour. To do so, they take advantage of
weekly and hourly behaviour cycles of the data, storing the
median of the values from each cycle, that define the expected
values of the time series. We will compare our proposed
technique to this system in section III.
II. ARCHITECTURE OF THE SYSTEM
We now dwell on the details of the proposed architecture as
well as the mechanisms behind the anomaly detection system,
which is the monitoring system core. We will describe two
different examples of techniques. The proposed architecture is
depicted in Figure 1.
A. Two phase monitoring system
Locating root causes may be a huge challenge for an
automatic monitoring system, hence, we propose a two phase
system of detection and inspection. Raw network traffic at
multi-Gb/s speeds [20] and raw event logs are centralized [21]
in a high-end network probe. Concurrently, a summary, in the
form of enriched records, is stored for real-time monitoring in
a second lower-end server , featuring visualization dashboards
for the analysts and service managers. These enriched records
provide information about connections, sessions or transac-
tions which have higher context that packet-level information.
As Goodall et al. state, “analysts often lose sight of the
“big picture” while examining these low-level details” [22],
referring to packet-level analysis.
Traffic and log collection is done in a centralized
fashion, gathering the traffic from a Switched Port Analyzer
(SPAN) port and the log information via standard applications,
available in most systems, such as syslog, SNMP or ssh.
These methods avoid disrupting production systems as much
as possible. When a disruption or anomalous behaviour is
detected on the summarized data, the analyst can perform
further inspection in the raw data.
1) Network Probe for collection: The deployed network
probe is an Intel® Xeon® CPU E5-2640 v2 @ 2.60GHz
system with 8 cores, 64 GB of RAM, and four 15TB RAID 0
storage systems, to store, in three of them, traffic captured from
different network interfaces. Each interface captures different
subnets or VLANs. The remaining RAID is used for inspection
analysis, data processing and other purposes.
The lessons learned during the development of the log
centralization system Loginson [21] have been applied for the
development of the system deployed in the aforementioned
network. M3OMON and HPCAP Intel NIC driver [20] are
used for traffic collection and generation of flow information
from the traffic. Collection of log messages is done through
direct copy at particular intervals while component information
(e.g. memory usage) is retrieved through SNMP.
Collected information is processed according to the analysis
requirements. Usually, the huge amount of raw data calls for
low-level high-performance solutions to dissect the different
traffic layers and protocols, such as HTTPanalyzer [13].
2) Virtual Machine for summarization: In 2015, the de-
ployed VM used modest resources, specifically, 8GB of RAM,
100GB of storage and four processing cores. As 2017 the VM
has doubled the storage and now features 12 GB of RAM
and eight processing cores. To store the summarized data,
we chose Elasticsearch due to its performance, and analytical
features which assist the statistical calculations of the analysis
(queries to calculate aggregations, statistics such as standard
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Fig. 1. Stages involved in the monitoring process. As we climb from the
wire to the charts the information is aggregated, from raw data to enriched
records and finally the charts, notifications or reports. The amount of data
is reduced at each stage, as well as the performance requirements while
versatility requirements increase.
deviations, medians, etc.). While traditional databases provide
diverse and refined query features, our use case, sacrifices
these characteristics in favor of speed, analytical features.
The internal storage architecture of the Elasticsearch
database, stores the documents in specific indices, made of a
group of shards, which are essentially Lucene Inverted Indices.
The different operations (aggregation, filter, etc.) are executed
at shard level, taking advantage of this given parallelism.
Once the raw data is processed in the network probe, the
corresponding enriched records are indexed in the VM, using
an Elasticsearch importer1. Tools for baseline generation,
anomaly detection and others have been developed in
Python, using the high-level elasticsearch-dsl library. For data
visualization, we use different technologies such as Kibana
(vis. plugin for Elasticsearch) or Plotly.
This simple architecture makes complete use of the vertical
resources, requiring fewer machines to work. This way, avail-
ability can be improved through replication active-active or
pasive-active of the monitoring system. Also, its extent can
be broaden through replication of the same architecture in
different departments. Also, elasticsearch database allows for
distribution and clusterization of multiple nodes.
B. Time Series Monitoring
In the next sections we describe two examples of monitoring
and anomaly detection with two pairs of proactive/reactive
methodologies. Specifically, we now dwell on the detection
of disruptions or anomalies in time series as well as the
creation of baselines to assist this process.
1Similar to: https://github.com/carlosvega/ElasticsearchImporter
1) Proactive methodology I: Baseline creation: With a big
enough historical record of data, we can conduct proactive
analysis for the generation of baselines that define the usual
behaviour of the analyzed metrics. To do so we consider the
previous N weeks. The larger the number, the more rigid the
baseline will be, making it harder to adapt to a new trend,
should it appear. As seen, during the weekend the traffic is
lower than on working days. A moving window of size W
(e.g. 10 min.) is considered, then, the data is grouped by
weekday, hour and minutes, rounded up to the window size.
For each of these groups, which consists of 4x10 values (or
NxW values), the median is calculated, yielding a time series
(here, 10 min. resolution) of expected values for the next week.
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Fig. 2. Baseline creation process making use of previous data.
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For a more detailed example, let us consider the time
series {Xn, n = 1, . . .} which represents the collected traffic
samples at a given time n, specifically in Fig. 2 the current
one and the 2 previous weeks with, one data point per minute.
Let the resulting moving-averaged time series be represented
by {Xˆn, n = 1, . . .}. In order to predict the time series value
at a given time k we consider the random vector
X Tm(k) = ( ˆXk−mT , ˆXk−(m−1)T , . . . , ˆXk−T ) (1)
whereby T denotes the time a week before the current time
k and m is the estimation span in number of weeks. Basically,
the vector is made up with the past values of the time series,
1, . . . ,m weeks before the current time. Let fm(k) be the
sampling distribution of X Tm(k), as defined in equation 1.
Thus, the time series {Xˆn, n = 1, . . .} forecast at time k
is given by median[fm(k)]. The median is a robust estimator
with a breakdown point of 50%. Besides, another similar series
with the standard deviation of the data groups instead of the
median is calculated. Together they set a threshold for each
moment of the week, as seen in the bottom chart of Figure 2.
This baseline will assist reactive tasks such as manual visual
inspection of charts or alarm systems for anomaly detection.
2) Reactive methodology I: Anomaly detection: Once the
baseline is calculated, we can detect disruptions in time series
with values higher than their threshold occurred over a given
time of grace. The tool uses static thresholds, or functions
of values. We can then use the baseline as well as other
related indicators for increased effectiveness. For instance, we
can alert if the incoming number of flows is higher than the
threshold and at the same time the number of outgoing flows
is zero, since this scenario might represent a service outage.
This kind of alarms provides versatility in three different
aspects. First, it allows the selection of concrete time intervals
and time aggregations of the selected data, as well as time
of grace conditions. Secondly, it offers filtering flexibility
for different granularities. Finally, ad-hoc functions to define
conditions can be set in order to use other metrics.
Figure 3 shows two examples of abnormal behaviour of
the metric. The first one, (red circle) occurs before noon and
shows how the data value surpassed the expected value and the
baseline threshold, during the time of grace interval. In this
scenario a notification would be generated for the network
manager. On the other hand, the second disruption, past noon,
does not pass these bounds, and hence, no warning is needed.
C. IP Geo-location Monitoring
We now introduce another example of simple methodologies
for anomaly detection, focused on web visits behaviour.
1) Proactive methodology II: Web access report: Web an-
alytics have an important role in market research and security
management. Geo-location of visitors helps to define access
patterns and product strategies.
The Regional Internet Registries databases such as the
ARIN or APNIC, among others, are the primary source of
tables relating geographical locations to IP address ranges. Ser-
vices like ip2location offer relational databases with different
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Fig. 4. CCDF of the requests per minute per country. Uncommon origins have very low probability of occurrence. X axis is in symlog scale
geographical resolutions. The proposed method is an extension
of a previously developed tool 2 for data visualization of
IP-location in off-line environments in the form of a map.
2) Reactive methodology II: Anomalous visits detection:
Anomalous visits can hide potential attacks which can under-
mine the proper operation of the services and affect their QoS.
Detecting these threats is crucial to prevent service outages and
roll out countermeasures. In the early stage of an attack, this
abnormal behavior, often consisting of visits from uncommon
places, has little impact in terms of Web visits, and may also
be legitimate, but the number can rapidly increase in case of
a real attack is happening.
Modeling the behavior of countries with few visits is
challenging, since in harmless scenarios these countries show
little activity or infrequent small bursts of visits, if any.
Figure 4 shows how uncommon origins have low probability
of occurrence in the first place. In this figure, Spain, United
States, France and United Kingdom are the four most common
sources of Web visits. Belarus also stands out, since, a single
IP address was the source of most visits from this country,
turning out to be a shipment tracking website.
However, the repeated observation of this anomalous ac-
tivity, usually higher than the previously observed behavior,
uninterrupted during a considerable amount of time is what
yields an alarm notification, sent to the manager in charge
for further analysis. For example, checking if the source IP
addresses are in any Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP) list or
inspecting the behaviour of these IPs in depth.
III. SYSTEM EVALUATION
In this section we address the performance details of the pro-
posed methodologies, from the architecture above described
to the proactive and reactive systems developed in accordance
with the aforementioned requirements of performance, sim-
plicity and versatility.
A. Baseline and Anomaly Detection Performance
Currently, on a weekly basis, the baseline generation system
calculates about 600 baseline time series using the 8 previous
2https://carlosvega.github.io/elasticGeoIPMaps/
weeks of data (with 1 minute resolution), considering more
than 48 million data points. These baselines correspond to
diverse metrics from different monitored services. The baseline
generation takes 1 hour and 15 minutes to complete. As
explained, these baselines are used by both the alarm system
and manual inspection of the charts by network managers.
The alarm system checks the most recent data (30 to 60
minutes of previous data), from more than 300 time series,
seeking for anomalies. This process takes less than 20 seconds
in normal conditions and always less than a minute during
high load periods. For the best-case the speed is around
1,000 elements per second. This process is done in parallel
with the data indexation, as well as the regular inspection of
dashboards by managers and analysts which generate queries
to the database. Today more than 10 million documents per
day are indexed in the database and is expected to grow.
The system proposed by Calheiros et al. [18] seen in
Section I-A4, uses aggregated data in 30 minute intervals. The
performance observed by Calheiros et al for calculating their
anomaly score was the following: “calculation of anomaly
scores of 2,722 data points [. . . ] took 28 milliseconds [. . . ]
The training time was in 579 milliseconds...”. This study
doesn’t consider the time it takes to query data stored in the
database with continuous queries from other systems. It neither
considers how long it takes to calculate what they call derived
attributes.
Last but not least, they do not consider the fact that usually,
the metrics of interest are stored together with other relevant
information such as the service name, and other metadata
which also makes the indexed elements bigger.
B. Performance of the Geo-location Monitoring
The map system considers the top 100,000 IP addresses by
number of visits from the chosen time interval and features a
per-country tooltip with the top 10 IPs with more requests.
This solution is able to generate an interactive map with
the last week data in less than a minute. The amount of data
considered for the four monitored web services is around
400,000 elements per week. Hence, in the worst case, it
could be up to 100,800 different IPs for an specific service.
The performance of the anomalous visits detection system is
similar to the anomaly detection system aforementioned.
C. Extent of the Monitoring System
Recently, the network coverage of the monitoring system
deployed in a Spanish logistics company has expanded. Fig-
ure 5 shows the amount of network traffic captured per day
during a particular week, as well as the amount and size of
TCP flows. In aggregate terms, the network probe captures
more than 10 Gbps of traffic, with more than 2.5 million
packets/s, from 1.5 million concurrent connections.
Regarding the summarized data, the amount of indexed
documents in the Elasticsearch database doesn’t cease to grow.
For example, in February 2017 the number of indexed doc-
uments per day was 2 million docs/day, and by January 2018
this number has already surpassed the 10 million docs/day and
more than 20 GB/month. A remarkable number considering
the number of concurrent tasks to be done, such as dashboard
visualization and data query, as well as the real-time alarm
systems and proactive analysis tools (e.g. baseline system).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Traditional approaches for network management over-
provision resources, wasting vertical scalability through large
cluster centralization systems. They also assume absolute
control over the monitored nodes, proposing agent-based
solutions, disregarding the bureaucratic hindrances that
impede deployments in production systems. An effective
network management must not disrupt the normal operation
of the center. It must also be proportionate to the size of the
monitored network, optimizing vertical scalability.
In this paper we proposed simple techniques to address
the aforementioned needs. Specifically, the architecture design
of the system, data centralization systems, and data analysis
methodologies. We evaluated the solution in a real enterprise
environment, with wide monitoring coverage, and achieved
great performance through vertical utilization of resources.
Additionally, we contributed releasing proof-of-concept ver-
sions of the tools used in our production systems.
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